Three Concepts of Roles by Wendel, W. Bradley
San Diego Law Review
Volume 48 | Issue 1 Article 38
2-1-2011
Three Concepts of Roles
W. Bradley Wendel
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr
Part of the Legal Profession Commons, and the Legal Theory Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law
Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, please contact digital@sandiego.edu.
Recommended Citation


















    
  
      
 
Three Concepts of Roles 
W. BRADLEY WENDEL*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 547 
II. HOW DO ROLES OBLIGATE? .............................................................................. 555 
III. ROLE OBLIGATION AND ORDINARY MORAL OBLIGATION ................................... 566 
A. Positive Claim: The Law of Lawyering Preserves a 
 Lawyer’s Integrity .................................................................................... 566 
B. Normative Claim: The Law of Lawyering Should
Preserve a Lawyer’s Integrity .................................................................. 569 
IV. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 574 
I. INTRODUCTION
One of Fred Zacharias’s many and varied interests in legal ethics was
the relationship between ordinary morality and the obligations imposed
on lawyers by the rules of their professional role.  This is an explicit
subject of several articles1 and a prominent theme in many others.2  In all
* Professor of Law, Cornell University.  The title is a pun on Rawls’s famous 
paper on the practice conception of rules.  See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 
PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).  The point of the pun is to suggest a connection between practices
and social conventions, on the one hand, and the authority of roles on the other.  The 
question of how roles should be moralized is an important but somewhat under appreciated
aspect of Fred’s scholarship on legal ethics.
1. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Five Lessons for Practicing Law in the Interests of 
Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939 (2002) [hereinafter Zacharias, Interests of Justice];
Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541 (2009) [hereinafter
Zacharias, Integrity]; Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 169 (1997) [hereinafter Zacharias, Reconceptualizing]; Fred C. Zacharias,
Steroids and Legal Ethics Codes: Are Lawyers Rational Actors?, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 








   
  
  
   




   
  
 




     
   
 
  
    
    
 
  
   
    
   
  
of these articles, Fred is concerned with the moral agency and integrity 
of the lawyer.3  He resists the picture of legal ethics as an “amoral” 
domain4 and denies that a lawyer is obligated “to put to one side 
considerations of various sorts—and especially various moral
considerations—that would otherwise be relevant if not decisive.”5  In  
Fred’s vision of ethical lawyering, the role of lawyer is itself a
worthwhile moral commitment, and to the extent it requires lawyers do
to something that would be contrary to the demands of ordinary
morality, the role provides safe harbors or escape valves for lawyers who 
insist on following their consciences.  He writes, for example, that 
“because ethics codes demand moral introspection from lawyers, they 
must leave lawyers a degree of discretion.”6  Roles cannot be all-
encompassing, and professional regulators should forget about their 
preoccupation to regulate comprehensively all aspects of the activities of 
lawyers.7  Moreover, roles do not create moral permissions to cause 
Lawyers, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 73 (2007) [hereinafter Zacharias, Images]; Fred C.
Zacharias, The Lawyer as Conscientious Objector, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 191 (2001). 
2. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2006); Fred C. Zacharias, Fitting Lying to 
the Court into the Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 491 
(2008); Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1303 (1995); Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of 
Law Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics
Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829 (2002). 
3. I found myself referring to Professor Zacharias as “Fred” as I was writing this 
Article and realized that in the back of my mind, I was assuming that he had read it, and
we would talk about it at a conference, and hopefully we would both learn something we 
could put to use in our future scholarship.  It is a measure of Fred’s impact on the
scholarly community that it is hard to imagine writing about these issues without having
him as a reader and commentator.  The familiar mode of address in this Article is
intended as a small sign of our collective loss.
4. See generally Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A 
Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (discussing
the “heated academic discourse” regarding the amorality of the lawyer’s role). Like all 
sophisticated defenders of the standard conception of legal ethics, Pepper offers moral
reasons why lawyers ought to be bound by the duties of their role, despite what seem to
be the contrary demands of ordinary morality. See id. at 628–35.  In Pepper’s case the 
argument depends on the value of autonomy. See id. at 617–19.  Thus, the word amoral
may have been an infelicitous one, but in any event, critics of the standard conception 
sometimes overlook the moral arguments that have been given by its defenders.  For 
recent arguments in favor of the standard conception, see TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF 
ROGUES? A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE (2009); and
W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010). 
5. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. 
RTS. 1, 3 (1975). 
6. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing, supra note 1, at 185; see also Zacharias, Steroids, 
supra note 1, at 697 (“[T]he codes are designed in part to produce morally diligent 
lawyers, not automatons who follow only specific prohibitions.”). 
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harm.8  The principle of nonaccountability, which is one of the three 
aspects of the standard conception of the lawyer’s role, is either false or
too strong.9 
In his recent article, Integrity Ethics, Fred explored the internal
normative structure of the lawyer’s role, distinguishing between rules of 
role and integrity rules.10  Rules of role are those norms that constitute a 
social role and regulate the activities of people acting in the capacity of a 
role occupant.  Integrity rules permit the occupant of a role to refer to
ordinary moral considerations in deliberation and to justify an action on 
the grounds of reasons and values that are external to the role.11  This  
structure is “designed to [en]sure that lawyers do not take the demands 
of role too far,”12 that is, to ensure that lawyers remain moral agents first 
and only secondarily subject to the obligations of role.13  Descriptively, 
the regime of professional regulation governing the American legal
profession is set up to “ensur[e] that lawyers behave as ordinary human
beings would behave if put into the same position as, and understanding 
the demands upon, lawyers.”14  Normatively, this is a good thing.  A role
ought to be designed to accomplish morally valuable ends, such as 
“furthering the adversarial system or . . . maintaining legal institutions.”15  If
a lawyer’s actions do not tend to further those ends, however, the lawyer 
should be guided by the ethics of ordinary persons.
The question Fred is concerned with in his work on role morality is a 
very general and important one.16  It is the question of the moral status of
8. See Zacharias, Interests of Justice, supra note 1, at 1941. 
9. For the principle of nonaccountability, see generally DARE, supra note 4, at 
10–11. 
10. See Zacharias, Integrity, supra note 1, at 553–54. 
11. Id. at 571 (“Integrity rules . . . are intended to remind lawyers that they are 
governed by, and may implement, generally applicable morality.”).
12. Id. at 545. 
13. See id. at 545. 
14. Id. at 547. 
15. Id. at 554. 
16. In its general form, the question raised here is how to deal with second-order 
reasons.  First-order reasons are considerations counting in favor of taking some action
or another, while second-order reasons are grounds for not acting on reasons.  See
JOSEPH RAZ, Law and Authority, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 3, 16–18 (1979).  Some
philosophers—most prominently Raz—believe conflicts between second-order and first-
order reasons are resolved by trumping or exclusion.  Criticizing this model, Michael 
Moore argues that what appear to be second-order reasons should be regarded as a 
species of newly created first-order reasons, albeit with very substantial weight, but that 
they should not exclude consideration of first-order reasons.  See Michael S. Moore,






















role obligations or how roles should be moralized.  The aim of this 
Article is to explore three alternative ways of conceiving of the
relationship between morality and role obligations.  The first, which is 
the target of Fred’s critical scrutiny, is strong role differentiation, often 
thought to be part and parcel of the standard conception.17  The standard 
conception of the lawyer’s role consists of the principles of partisanship,
neutrality, and nonaccountability.  For present purposes, the important 
implication of the standard conception is the exclusion of ordinary moral 
reasons from the deliberation of lawyers acting in a professional
capacity.  Lawyers adhering to the standard conception are directed to 
seek to protect or advance the legal rights of their clients—partisanship; 
not to consider their own views of the moral merits of their clients’ 
positions—neutrality; and to rest assured that they will not be subject to
justified moral criticism by observers—nonaccountability.18 This
conception of role is said to be differentiated to the extent it posits 
exclusionary obligations or permissions—role-specific prescriptions that
preempt, supersede, or outweigh what would otherwise be requirements 
of ordinary morality.  This is a conception of roles as generating 
exclusionary reasons,19 which is central to the way I tend to think about
professional obligations.20  Arguably, if roles create exclusionary 
reasons, once one is functioning as an occupant of a role, there is no way
to refer back to ordinary moral considerations, except by exiting the role 
altogether. 
The second way of understanding the relationship between morality 
and roles is what I call the nexus view.  A role, in this way of looking at
17. See DARE, supra note 4, at 29; see also  ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 2–3 (1980) (distinguishing strong role 
differentiation from the requirement that a role occupant “figure in his moral calculations 
all consequences deriving from the institutional relations with others created by the 
position”).
18. DARE, supra note 4, at 74–75. 
19. The Rawlsian approach to practices involves preemption of reasons that would
otherwise be taken into account in all-things-considered deliberation.  See Rawls, supra
note *, at 14–17 (1955).  For example, if we give a utilitarian justification for the 
practice of promising—that there is great value in having a means to create and enforce 
expectations of future conduct by other people—the justification may be undercut in any
given case in which the balance of utilities favors breaking the promise.  There is no way
to account for the stringency of the obligation to keep promises solely on utilitarian 
grounds because there very well might be cases in which the best thing, as a whole, 
would be for the promisor to break the promise.  The explanation for keeping promises is
instead that many practices, including promising, are constituted by rules, which are not 
simply guides, summaries, or rules of thumb that simplify the all-things-considered 
moral evaluation of what should be done, but are conclusive demands that are binding as
long as one is acting within that practice.  Id. at 24–25. 
20. See  WENDEL, supra note 4, at 86–89 (arguing for an exclusionary-reasons
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things, is merely a shorthand way of describing a cluster of obligations, 
permissions, and aspirations that apply by virtue of standing in a 
particular kind of relationship with others.21  If I leave work early one
day to see one of my children in a concert at school, I could explain to
my dean that I had an obligation, as a parent, to go see the performance.
There is nothing ontologically mysterious about this explanation.  The 
invocation of the parental role is just a way of summarizing reasons
relating to what I owe to my children—my time, presence, interest in
their activities, involvement in their education, knowing their teachers 
and friends, and so on.  If the role obligation seems to supersede another 
duty, arising from ordinary morality or from another role—in this case,
my role as a teacher—it is only because the reasons bound up in the role 
explanation should take precedence, in these circumstances, over other 
considerations.  Speaking of “occupants” and “roles” is thus somewhat
misleading because a person does not enter a different evaluative domain
even when that person’s actions might naturally be described in role 
terms.  Rather, there is only one normative domain, that of ordinary
morality.  On this account there are what one might call natural roles,
such as parent or physician, which refer to a concatenation of obligations 
arising from truths about what kinds of creatures we are, such as the 
dependence of children upon their parents or the fact that people get sick
and are in need of medical care.22 
The third way of conceptualizing roles is what I believe Fred is 
arguing for in his Integrity Ethics article and elsewhere.  This is the idea
of a recourse role.  Gerald Postema’s well-known article introduced this
idea into the legal ethics literature,23 but it has its origin in a classic book 
by Mortimer and Sanford Kadish, Discretion to Disobey.24  The Kadish 
brothers argue that sometimes the best way to remain faithful to the 
21. See, e.g., ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY 
OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 45 (1999) (“[A]re roles merely shorthand 
for a nexus of obligations, values, and goods that have moral weight without appeal to 
role as a moral category?”); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY
125 (1988) (“[T]he appeal to a role in moral justification is simply a shorthand method
of appealing to the moral reasons incorporated in that role.”). Tim Dare calls this the
“direct route” for moralizing roles.  See  DARE, supra note 4, at 33–40 (critiquing this 
approach).
22. APPLBAUM, supra note 21, at 48–49. 
23. See Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 63, 82–83 (1980). 
24. See MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A 

























requirements of a role is to violate them.  A role is constituted for some 
end.  In many cases—maybe even most, depending on the role—the best
way for a role occupant to accomplish those ends is to follow the
directives of the role.  In the case of lawyers, that would mean
complying with state rules of professional conduct and other aspects of
the law governing lawyers, as well as respecting informal ideals of the 
role such as zealousness in representation.  There may be instances,
however, in which the best way to achieve the ends of a role is to do
something that is not permitted by the constitutive rules of the role.  In 
order to make this determination, the occupant of a role must have 
recourse to the ends of the role—hence the name “recourse role.”25  The
important thing about the Kadishes’ analysis is that recourse roles build 
in the permission to go back to an all-things-considered evaluative 
standpoint.  One is not exiting the role, but acting within it, when having 
recourse to the ends of the role.  Judges who nullify the law are not
acting lawlessly because the role itself permits this kind of incorporation
of ordinary morality. 
Each of these approaches has characteristic strengths and weaknesses.
Strong role differentiation offers lawyers a simplified moral universe at 
the cost of cutting lawyers off from the resources of ordinary morality, 
which results in a sense of alienation and perhaps even of wrongdoing.26 
Roles appear to encourage, or at least permit, evasion of moral
responsibility.  Role occupants can externalize moral blame onto the 
role, prompting the observation that it cannot possibly be the case that 
“‘it be right that a man should, with a wig on his head, and a band round 
his neck, do for a guinea what, without those appendages, he would 
think it wicked and infamous to do for an empire.’”27  There seems to be
some kind of normative sleight of hand going on if a role purports to
justify that which would otherwise be morally wrongful.  If something is
right, on the other hand, then the rightness should be captured by a direct 
pass-through of the moral evaluation.  The nexus view thus eliminates 
conflicts between professional roles and ordinary morality, but its critics 
argue that it does so at the cost of undervaluing the ends served by the 
roles.  Opening deliberation to case-by-case rebalancing of the
underlying moral reasons tends to result in the policies underlying a role 
having very little weight.28  Although it is appealing to insist that
25. Id. at 21–22. 
26. For powerful critiques, see Postema, supra note 23, at 75–76, 79; and Wasserstrom, 
supra note 5.
27. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 9 (2007) (quoting Thomas 
Babington Macaulay, Francis Bacon, in 2 CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS 317 (1926)).
28. See David Wasserman, Should a Good Lawyer Do the Right Thing? David
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someone acting in a role remains fully accountable as a moral agent, the
difficulty is that the morally valuable ends of a role can be eroded by
giving evaluative priority to particular cases, as opposed to the long-run 
stability and proper functioning of institutions.  In any given case, the 
marginal harm to the ends served by a role appears to be relatively
insignificant, as compared with the personal involvement in wrongdoing
that the role appears to demand.  As a result, roles end up justifying very 
few departures from ordinary morality.29 
The idea of recourse roles is intended to steer a middle course.  Roles
do create genuine obligations for their occupants, which in many cases
require departures from the requirements of ordinary morality.  If the 
role appears to demand an action that is contrary to the ends of the role, 
however, the actor is justified in departing from the specific
requirements of the role in order to further the substantive, underlying 
policies embodied in the role.  I have argued for a fairly strong version 
of the standard conception, taking the nexus view as my primary point of
departure.  Upon reflection, it seems that the more significant challenge 
to my position comes from the conception of professional obligations as 
a recourse role.30  Recourse roles do not permit case-by-case rebalancing 
of the underlying moral reasons.  Rather, they contemplate a role that
builds in the discretion to act directly on the ends of the role: “Though 
such a role may still require a role agent to act in a certain way, it may
also permit him to conclude that complying with the role’s prescribed
means would obstruct the role activity or defeat the role’s task or
institutional ends.”31  This is not wide-open moral deliberation; rather,
an agent has recourse only to certain considerations, such as the specific
task the role is designed to accomplish.32  Although this is a somewhat
limited scope of deliberation, it is nevertheless a powerful argument 
against the standard conception and the idea of strong role
differentiation.  A proponent of the idea of recourse roles would claim it 
is perverse to follow the requirements of a role—what the Kadishes call
the roles-prescribed means—when to do so would result in defeating the 
29. See DARE, supra note 4, at 39. 
30. I am grateful to the participants in the jurisprudence panel at the Fourth 
International Legal Ethics Conference (ILEC4) at Stanford Law School, in July 2010. 
William Simon in particular raised objections that I was not able to answer adequately at
the time, and David Luban reminded me of the Kadishes’ idea of recourse roles. 
31. KADISH & KADISH, supra note 24, at 29. 
32. See id. at 22. 
553
   
 
 



















    
role’s institutional ends. Why should a lawyer follow the self-defeating
strategy of adhering to some course of action that runs directly contrary
to the values served by the professional role? 
At the risk of oversimplifying a subtle argument, I take this to be the
basic structure of Simon’s critique of the standard conception.33 His
argument goes like this: The legal system and the associated role of 
lawyer are constituted for some purpose.  The moral foundation of the 
legal system is the value of justice.34  Bizarrely, however, lawyers think 
their role permits or requires them to promote the interests of their 
clients even if doing so would lead to injustice.35  This is incoherent, and 
lawyers lack any good reason to respect the conventional norms of legal 
practice.36  Ethical lawyering instead must be understood as that which
aims at justice.  It may do so indirectly if the lawyer has reason to 
believe that the institutions and procedures of the adversary system are 
functioning adequately.37  When procedures cannot be relied upon to
reach a just resolution, however, the lawyer must take personal
responsibility for the justice of the outcome.38  The conditions under 
which one may opt out of the demands of a role are therefore tied to the 
reasons for which the role was constituted in the first place.  It would be
incoherent to adhere to the demands of the role when these ends are not 
being served because the only reason the role creates legitimate demands 
in the first place—in the sense of having some claim to be morally
worthy—is that the role is constituted and regulated to accomplish some
morally worthy end. 
No sensible person believes that the role creates absolute demands that 
can never be overridden. Even supporters of strong role differentiation 
believe that eventually the obligations of one’s role must give way to 
other obligations.  The reason is that, in order to be legitimate, the 
demands created by roles must have some moral foundation, and it is 
unlikely that there can be any absolute demand of morality that does not
admit of exceptions in extraordinary circumstances.  The question for 
role theorists, including Fred in his work on the relationship between
roles and morality, is when the demands of roles can be overridden.  In
the discussion that follows, I will analyze the way in which roles create 
obligations for their occupants and consider the question of when the 
demands of role must give way to other obligations, grounded in
33. See  WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ 
ETHICS (1998). 
34. Id. at 2. 
35. See id. at 27–31. 
36. See id. at 156–62. 
37. See id. at 139–40. 
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ordinary morality.  The conclusion will be that the notion of recourse 
roles is compatible with the standard conception, as long as the
conditions under which an actor may invoke the underlying ends of the 
role are strict enough.
II. HOW DO ROLES OBLIGATE? 
A role is “what one ordinarily has in mind when one speaks of acting 
in a certain capacity, or of being constrained by one’s position, or of 
standing in a certain relationship to someone.”39  Roles and associated 
norms can be the product of deliberate institutional design, or they can
result from a gradual evolution of social expectations regarding
appropriate action under some role description—“parent,” “teacher,” or 
“doctor.”40  The role of lawyer results from both intentional actions and 
a network of expectations.  Official lawmaking institutions, such as state 
courts, promulgate enforceable rules of professional conduct, and 
lawyers are subject to the constraints of generally applicable law.  At the 
same time, many of the most important norms governing the profession
result from tradition, custom, and social expectations.  The idea of
zealous advocacy, for example, has never been an enforceable legal rule, 
but it is one of the strongest normative commitments characterizing the 
American legal profession.  Similarly, although the United States does 
not have a “cab-rank” rule, requiring lawyers to accept all representations 
they are competent to carry out, there is an informal norm of representing
unpopular clients.41  In both the zealous advocacy and client selection 
cases, a lawyer would be subject to criticism for violating these
expectations.  Moreover, a lawyer viewing her role from the internal 
point of view—as creating justified obligations—would believe herself 
to be required to be a zealous advocate and to represent unpopular 
clients, even though there is no formal legal rule establishing these 
duties. 
Formal and informal norms—those that result from authoritative
lawmaking and those that arise more organically, out of conventional 
social behavior—both constitute a professional role and regulate the 
activities of people acting in a professional capacity.  The distinction 
39. KADISH & KADISH, supra note 24, at 15. 
40. See DARE, supra note 4, at 30. 
41. For the ideal of zealous advocacy and the cab-rank principle in U.S. law, see 











   
 
  











alluded to here is from John Searle, who points out the importance of 
rules or conventions that constitute an activity as opposed to merely
regulating a preexisting activity.42  Searle’s example is the collective
intentionality surrounding money.  One cannot give a causal account to
explain the function of currency without referring to conventions that 
assign a particular status to a little green piece of paper, described in a 
certain way.  Constitutive rules enable us to go beyond the “sheer brute 
physical functions” of objects.43  Something counting as money is not a 
physical, causal relationship.  Rather, it depends on collective agreement
and the social acceptance of little green pieces of paper, featuring 
pictures of dead presidents, as a medium of exchange.  Conventions
change the meaning of objects and actions.  Moreover, the convention of 
treating pieces of paper as a medium of exchange acquires normative 
status.44  It is possible to make “ought” statements regarding the pieces 
of paper—one ought to accept a five-dollar bill in exchange for coffee 
and a bagel, or one ought not to attempt to counterfeit paper currency.
Normativity thus arises from a conventional practice of treating some act 
or object in a given way, in some context.45 
Searle’s account of constitutive rules has a great deal in common with 
H.L.A. Hart’s explanation of the normativity of law.  A legal system 
purports to create reasons for action that are acknowledged by citizens 
using the language of obligation, such as “ought,” “duty,” “right,” and 
“wrong.”46  The normativity of law cannot be explained simply in terms 
of behavioral regularities—people tend to stop at red lights, pay their 
taxes, et cetera.47  Hart further distinguishes between acting out of
obligation from acting because one feels obliged.48  Acquiescing in the
demand of a robber reflects a sense of being obliged to act, which is a 
prudential reason, while paying taxes out of a sense that it is the right
42. See JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 43–51 (1995). 
43. See id. at 44. 
44. Id. at 48. 
45. As Rawls argues, the content of standards regulating a practice is linked with 
the purpose underlying the practice. See Rawls, supra note *; cf. Zacharias,
Reconceptualizing, supra note 1, at 176–77 (noting that lawyers’ obligations may vary
depending on social expectations). 
46. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 57 (2d ed. 1994). 
47. See Stephen R. Perry, Hart’s Methodological Positivism, in  HART’S 
POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 311 (Jules Coleman
ed., 2001); see also HART, supra note 46, at 89 (“If . . . the observer really keeps
austerely to this extreme external point of view and does not give any account of the 
manner in which members of the group who accept the rules view their own regular
behaviour, his description of their life cannot be in terms of rules at all, and so not in the 
terms of the rule-dependent notions of obligation or duty.”). 
48. See HART, supra note 46, at 82–83, 88–89; Brian Bix, H.L.A. Hart and the 
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thing to do reflects obligation, a normative notion.  The foundation of 
Hart’s jurisprudence is the argument that, in order for there to be a legal
system instead of either happenstance behavioral regularities or mere
coercion, it is necessary that judges accept a rule of recognition from the 
internal point of view.49  Here are two essential Hartian concepts: The 
internal point of view is the perspective of one who accepts a practice as
creating justified demands, namely, obligations.50  The rule of recognition 
specifies criteria for identifying the sources of law, which can include
judicial decisions, statutes and administrative regulations, and even 
conventions such as interpretive methodologies and canons of statutory 
construction.51  Like Searle’s explanation of how handing over a piece of 
green paper can create an obligation to deliver some good or service, 
Hart’s explanation shows how there can be a genuine obligation to act 
on the grounds of reasons given by authoritative legal sources.
Strictly speaking, Hart’s account extends only to the obligations of 
judges and only with respect to secondary rules.  He says that citizens 
are not required to take the internal point of view with regard to the 
law,52 and he has nothing whatsoever to say about the obligations of 
lawyers.  I have argued, however, that citizens can commit themselves to 
taking the internal point of view if they seek to avail themselves of a
49. See HART, supra note 46, at 116 (“[If the rule of recognition] is to exist at all, 
[it] must be regarded from the internal point of view as a public, common standard of 
correct judicial decision, and not as something which each judge merely obeys for his 
part only.”). 
50. Id. at 89; see also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL 
THEORY 190 (2d ed. 1984) (“To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those 
standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them.”).  The 
invocation of MacIntyre here, and his notion of practices, is intentional and reflects my
view that the normativity of roles arises in the same way as normativity arises in 
practices generally.
51. See HART, supra note 46, at 100–01. 
52. See id. at 116 (“[P]rivate citizens . . . may obey each ‘for his part only’ and 
from any motive whatever; though in a healthy society they will in fact often accept
these rules as common standards of behaviour and acknowledge an obligation to obey
them.”); see also Kenneth Einar Himma, Law’s Claim of Legitimate Authority, in
HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 47, 
at 271, 286 (“While legal normativity requires that officials take the internal point of 
view towards the rule of recognition, it does not require that citizens do so.”); Stephen R.
Perry, Holmes Versus Hart: The Bad Man in Legal Theory, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND 
ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 158, 169 (Steven J. 
Burton ed., 2000)  (noting that Hart “maintains that the only persons who must be 
regarded as having adopted the [internal] point of view are judges,” and calling this a 



















       
   
 
legal justification for their actions.53  Appeals to the legitimating 
discourse of legality necessarily imply that one is committed to 
acknowledging that the law creates genuine rights and duties.  One can 
speak as an external observer, and note that a practice creates obligations 
for those who are “inside” the practice, but deny that one is obligated 
oneself.54  But once one expresses acceptance of a norm, one is taking 
the internal point of view, not a detached, external perspective.
Appealing to the law as a justification for an action implies that both the 
speaker and the person to whom the justification is addressed accept that 
the legality of an action makes a difference, normatively speaking. 
Invoking legality engages with the reasons why the procedures of
lawmaking and law application in a democracy are legitimate.  Doing 
something pursuant to a legal justification expresses respect for the
underlying fact that citizens may disagree about what rights they ought
to have but recognize that some resolution of this disagreement is 
necessary so that a stable framework for coexistence can arise.  Law is 
an alternative to the exercise of naked power, which fails to manifest
respect for the equality of all citizens who are affected by an action. 
One of the most important functions of the discourse of ethics is 
justifying one’s actions when they affect the interests of another.55 
Legality creates the possibility of giving an ethical justification that
invokes the values of dignity and respect in the context of people living
together in a political community.  Imagine that a local government unit 
takes part of a person’s land, paying fair market value for it, and uses it
to build a highway.  If the owner protests, the government could either 
respond (1) “you are powerless to resist us, so be thankful we paid 
anything at all for your land,” or (2) “we took your land pursuant to a 
legal process that ensures you would be treated fairly and the land taken
only for public purposes.”  The first statement expresses raw power and 
the ability of the stronger to dominate the weaker.  The second expresses 
respect for the landowner as a fellow citizen, whose voice counts in the 
process of establishing a framework of norms within which citizens can
53. See W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers, Citizens, and the Internal Point of View, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1473 (2006).  The argument in that paper was influenced by Kevin 
Toh, Hart’s Expressivism and His Benthamite Project, 11 LEGAL THEORY 75, 83 (2005). 
54. See  JOSEPH RAZ, The Nature of Law and Natural Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF 
LAW, supra note 16, at 37, 153–57 [hereinafter RAZ, Nature of Law]; JOSEPH RAZ, 
PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 175–77 (1975).  Standard examples of statements from 
a detached normative point of view include a non-Catholic’s advice to a friend,
“You ought to go to Mass today,” or a meat-eater saying to a vegetarian, “You shouldn’t 
eat that dish—it contains meat.” 
55. See generally T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998) (setting
out a contractualist metaethics, in which the basic strategy of justification is to seek a set 
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coexist.  Presumably, the local government unit possesses eminent
domain power that is created and regulated by statute, and all affected
citizens have an equal opportunity to lobby their state’s legislature for 
changes to the law.  This opportunity may not count for much.  There is 
a reason we all know the saying, “You cannot fight City Hall.”  Still, it is 
not insignificant that the state is constrained by the requirement that it 
act only pursuant to a legal justification and that the lawmaking process
is open to input from the individuals subject to state power.56  The  
discourse of legality also ensures compliance with rule-of-law values,
such as generality, impartiality, and fair notice.57 
The idea here is that one can get “inside” practices, roles, or discursive
communities.  Once inside the practice, the norms governing the practice 
are obligatory for the participant.  The further question, however, is 
whether one has a reason to opt in to a practice or role.  The answer to 
this question will tell us a great deal about how the role should be
structured.  In particular, it will address the idea of having recourse to
external considerations, such as ordinary morality.  With respect to law 
and the role of lawyer, what reason would anyone have to take into 
consideration whether something is lawful when deliberating about what 
to do?  If legality should make some difference, then there is an answer 
to the question of why anyone ought to appeal to the discourse of law as 
a justifying strategy.  Notice that the nexus view of roles is committed to 
denying that the law changes deliberation in any distinctive way.  If 
something is unlawful, that fact may affect the balance of reasons if the 
actor is interested in avoiding legal penalties or social sanctions for
being a lawbreaker.  But these are reasons the actor had anyway, 
56. The example in the text involves a Hohfeldian power on the part of the state,
which is correlated with a liability on the part of the landowner.  The normative idea is 
that the power is justified because it is lawfully exercised.  A similar analysis can be
given of different legal relationships.  Suppose I park on the street and do not get a 
ticket.  My explanation of this fact can be either (1) I got away with it because there were 
not enough police officers writing tickets in that area at that time, or (2) I had a right to
park there because I put coins in the meter, or it was after 6:00 p.m.  The second 
explanation invokes a Hohfeldian privilege on my part, which is correlated with a “no
right” on the part of the state—a lack of rightful authority to penalize me for parking. 
The first explanation does not invoke any juridical relationship at all, appealing instead
to happenstance.  See generally  WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL 
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923). 
57. Cf. Scott J. Shapiro, The Bad Man and the Internal Point of View, in THE PATH 
OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., supra
note 52, at 206 (arguing that, for Hart, what distinguishes law from other forms of social 
guidance is that the law provides guidance through rules). 
559
  














   
   
 
  
independent of the legal status of the action.  On the nexus view, there is 
no way to account for the idea of the law creating obligations.58  The  
sanction-avoiding, Holmesian bad-man attitude does not differentiate 
between the law and any other exercise of power, nor can it differentiate 
between being obligated to do something and feeling obliged to do so, 
out of desire to avoid the negative consequences of violating the law. 
To see what difference law makes, consider one of the classic legal 
ethics cases.59 Borrower runs a small business.  He borrows $5000 from
Lender, his neighbor, and executes a simple promissory note agreeing to 
repay Lender beginning on a certain date.  The date passes, and Lender
never asks for the money back.  Seven years pass, and the economic 
situation of the parties reverses dramatically.  Borrower’s small business 
has flourished and was acquired by a much larger company; he is now a
highly compensated executive with that company.  Lender has fallen on 
hard times; he lost his job, had his house foreclosed upon by the bank, 
and is now in desperate need of money to meet medical expenses.  A
friend of Lender who is a lawyer agrees to represent him for free, in an 
attempt to recover the $5000 plus interest that Borrower owes him. 
Borrower, who could write a check for $5000 and hardly notice the
difference in his bank account balance, directs his lawyer to oppose
Lender’s claim, using “any lawful means.”  The applicable statute of 
limitations provides that an action to recover on a debt must be filed
within six years of the debtor’s default.  Borrower’s lawyer accordingly 
files a motion to dismiss the lawsuit as time-barred, which the trial judge 
granted. 
On the nexus view, the analysis would be given in straightforward 
moral terms.  In ordinary life, breaking promises is wrong.  Promises 
create obligations, and people act wrongly when they break their
promises without a good reason.  Adding the further fact that the 
promisor had subsequently become wealthy and could easily afford to 
repay a debt to the promisee, who badly needed the money, may
58. One of the targets of Hart’s jurisprudential theory is the so-called Holmesian
bad-man theory of law, after the definition of law given by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Holmes defined the law from the standpoint of a person who was interested only in
avoiding legal sanctions and thus was interested in predicting how legal officials might 
decide particular cases.  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. 
L. REV. 457, 459–62 (1897). Hart’s idea of the internal point of view is intended to
capture the perspective of a citizen who wishes to follow the law for nonprudential reasons. 
See BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 51 (4th ed. 2006). 
59. The discussion of this case is adapted from WENDEL, supra note 4.  The 
problem is based on the classic case of Zabella v. Pakel, 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957), 
although I have embellished the facts in some places and simplified them in others.
Zabella serves as an example in many leading works of legal ethics theory.  See, e.g., 
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augment the sense of wrongdoing.  Perhaps the disparity in wealth
between the parties creates an additional obligation of fairness, or the 
promisor’s failure to perform his promise has worse consequences than 
the failure to repay a debt to a creditor who has plenty of money.
Applying these ordinary moral reasons to the analysis of Borrower’s 
lawyer’s decision to plead the statute of limitations, it seems difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that Borrower is cheating somehow—evading his 
legitimate obligation to Lender—and that Borrower’s lawyer is helping 
him cheat.60 
The nexus view is incapable of capturing the distinctiveness of the
institutional context, and the difference that legality makes.  Failing to 
repay a legitimate debt may be described in moral terms as cheating or 
chiseling, but pleading the statute of limitations seems to call for a
different description, in distinct evaluative terms, because the defense to
the claim for repayment is part of a system that has been established to 
adjudicate the legitimacy of the obligation.61  Calling Borrower’s
obligation “just,” and thus criticizing his lawyer in moral terms, may be
putting the cart before the horse by assuming the debt is justly owed
when that is exactly what the legal system needs to determine.  The legal
justice of the obligation in this case is a function not only of Borrower’s
having agreed to repay Lender but of Lender’s having followed certain
formal procedures to establish a legally enforceable claim to repayment. 
But why should we care about legal justice, as opposed to
substantive—moral—justice?  A proponent of the nexus view might 
respond that she and I are talking past each other.  My claim is that if we
value the evaluative notion of legality, then we do not describe Borrower 
as a cheater, but there is still a big “if” in that argument.  Although a 
complete answer to the question would require much more detail,62 the
short answer is that we should care about legal justice because when we 
make decisions collectively, as a society, about what rights and duties 
we ought to have with respect to one another; we necessarily reason 
from a third-person-plural standpoint, one in which the beliefs about 
60. That, at least, is how Daniel Markovits analyzes the case, as part of his 
argument that the lawyer’s professional role comprehensively obligated lawyers to lie
and cheat.  See DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY 
IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 64–65 (2008). 
61. See APPLBAUM, supra note 21, at 91–96 (arguing that descriptions in ordinary
moral terms persist, despite the existence of other practice-based descriptions).

















   
right and wrong of any given person are inputs into a decisionmaking
process but not conclusive of the answer to the question of what should 
be done.  People disagree about what morality requires, in general and in 
particular cases.  As John Finnis puts it, we have to engage in practical 
reasoning about the relationship between our own well-being and the 
well-being of others.63  Although we can agree on the importance of 
certain basic values at a high level of generality, we have to determine 
what these moral values mean in terms of concrete, practical action.  Our 
reasoning about the demands of morality must be coordinated with that 
of others; without this coordination, we cannot be said to be acting in a 
community.64 When we act in communities with others, and our actions
affect the interests of others, we have to think about what morality
demands of us as individuals but also be sensitive to the possibility that 
others might disagree with our specification of concrete principles for 
action and how competing principles should be weighted and prioritized. 
The role of the law, on this version of a social contract theory of 
obligation, is to coordinate the efforts of all citizens to comply with the 
demands of morality in a political community.65  Individual reason alone
will not lead to a conclusion regarding what morality requires in a 
community because compliance with morality in a community means
coordinating one’s own beliefs about morality with the beliefs of others. 
This is, in part, a conceptual argument.  When we reason about what 
rights and duties we have, which are socially sanctioned in some way,
we are appealing to the idea of a political authority that coordinates the 
attempts of citizens to comply with the demands of morality.  This
authority need not necessarily be one that respects the ideal of the rule of 
law.  Citizens could coordinate their compliance with the demands of 
morality by referring questions about what ought to be done to a
recognized source of moral wisdom like a sage or a member of the 
clergy, and I suppose they could even consult soothsayers or oracles. 
People could also, of course, attempt to persuade each other.  In a large, 
modern, decentralized, liberal, pluralist, secular society, however,
citizens generally opt to establish institutions and procedures for the 
purpose of prescribing socially sanctioned rights and duties.  These 
institutions and procedures are themselves subject to moral evaluation, 
in terms of distinctively political values, such as representativeness,
responsiveness, transparency, and efficiency.  Ideally, it would be 
possible for every citizen to have as much of a voice in the process as
possible, consistent with the needs of other citizens also to have a voice. 
63. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 134 (1980). 
64. Id. at 147–50. 
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Even though this ideal is seldom realized, the underlying value is the 
same, namely that of equality.66  No one’s views should count more than
those of others, and citizens should not act peremptorily by substituting 
their beliefs about what ought to be done for the socially sanctioned 
rights and duties created by political procedures and institutions. 
The reason to opt in to the justifying discourse of legality, therefore, is 
that it manifests respect for the equal worth and dignity of one’s fellow
citizens.  People who disagree can deal with each other in various ways. 
The least respectful way involves attempting to dominate others by 
physical force or intimidation.  This response to disagreement fairly 
obviously displays the attitude that others are merely obstacles to 
realizing the satisfaction of one’s desires, not to mention creating the 
cycle of violence and fear so memorably described by Hobbes.67   A
more respectful way of handling disagreement is to seek to persuade
others.  An attempt at persuasion appeals to another’s status as someone
who can be moved by appeals to shared interests and values, thereby
displaying recognition of the equality of the participants in the dialogue, 
at least with respect to the capacity to deliberate on reasons.68  If  
persuasion is ineffective, however, a society needs to be able to fall back
on procedures that do as well as possible at treating the views of all
citizens as presumptively entitled to respect, consistent with the need to 
eventually resolve the dispute and settle on a common course of action 
in the name of the community as a whole.  The aim for which these
political procedures are constituted is to manifest respect for the status of 
others as bearers of moral rights.  If a group claims that the law does not 
really create an obligation, it is in effect claiming a kind of superior 
power over its fellows, an immunity from having to abide by the same 
rules as others.  It is no different than pushing to the front of a queue or 
using connections to get a child into an elite private school.  The reaction
that people have to those who jump queues or exploit connections— 
“Hey, you jerk!  What makes you special?”—manifests the sense of
offense we experience at having been treated as less than an equal by the
66. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 114–17 (1999). 
67. See  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
Rev. Student Ed. 1991) (1651). 
68. See WALDRON, supra note 66, at 282 (“The identification of someone as a 
right-bearer expresses a measure of confidence in that person’s moral capacities—in 
particular his capacity to think responsibly about the moral relation between his interests

















     
 
 
     





offender.  That is the normative underpinning of the practice of 
justifying one’s actions with respect to the law. 
To the extent we speak of the law creating obligations, and excluding 
reference to ordinary moral reasons, we are asserting that the law has
authority over its subjects.  Authority, legitimacy, and obligation are all
related terms, so it is important to keep clear on the relationship between 
them.69  Although there can be theoretical authorities—who alter the
reasons one has to believe something—for our purposes we are
concerned with practical authorities—who give reasons that serve as
premises in practical inferences.70  That an authority has said “do such 
and such,” or “do not do such and such,” is a reason for the subject of
authority.  In this way, the authority has normative power over its 
subject.  Significantly, the directive of an authority is a second-order
reason—a reason to act, or not to act, on other reasons.71  It excludes 
reference to one’s judgment of the merits of the case for acting.  To 
accept a directive as authoritative means to treat it not as another reason 
to be factored into the balance of first-order reasons that bear on 
decisionmaking but to regard it as preempting that kind of
decisionmaking process altogether.72 Why on earth should anyone
accept an authoritative directive as exclusionary?  It would indeed be 
irrational to follow the commands of an authority unless the authority
were legitimate.73  A legitimate directive, however, is issued by an 
authority with the right to rule.  This right correlates with duties on the
part of the subject.  These can be strong duties, such as the obligation of 
obedience, or something weaker, such as a duty of noninterference or to 
respect the law. 
Joseph Raz has argued that the normal way of justifying authority— 
establishing that it is legitimate—is to establish that following authority
is likely to enable the subject to do better at complying with the reasons 
that would have applied to the subject anyway.74  There is a deep 
connection between legitimacy and democracy because Raz also argues 
that the primary function of political authorities is to serve the
69. For a helpful overview and clarification of these concepts, see generally Tom 
Christiano, Authority, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Jul. 2, 2004), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authority/.  Legal theorists tend to run them all together
in practice.  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 191 (1986) (“A state is
legitimate if its constitutional structure and practices are such that its citizens have
a general obligation to obey political decisions that purport to impose duties on them.”). 
70. See RAZ, Nature of Law, supra note 54, at 10. 
71. Id. at 17. 
72. Id. at 27. 
73. See generally A. JOHN SIMMONS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 40–45 (2008); JOSEPH 
RAZ, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 194, 212 (1994). 
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governed.75  In a liberal democracy, legitimacy requires that government
authorities issue directives that are rooted in considerations that may be
endorsed by all affected citizens, as free and equal coparticipants in 
governance.76 I have argued that, in a liberal society, these considerations
are the fact of reasonable pluralism—disagreement that cannot be settled 
by reasoning alone—and the need to settle on a basis for mutually
beneficial cooperation.  In light of these considerations, as Finnis notes,
“There must be either unanimity, or authority.  There are no other
possibilities.”77  If reason alone is insufficient to secure unanimity—and
I believe it is—then the only possibility for citizens who are bound to 
comply with the requirements of morality in a community is to follow 
the directives of an authority, which is generally the law.78 
The same pattern of argument explains the moral reasons that inform 
the lawyer’s role.  Recall on the Rawlsian approach to practices, there
are moral reasons for constituting the practice and then for precluding 
subsequent case-by-case evaluation of the morality of actions within the 
practice.  The social function of the law is to settle normative disagreement
procedurally and to adopt a provisional social settlement of moral 
conflict that excludes evaluation on the basis of the reasons that otherwise
would have applied to the parties.  Thus, the social function of lawyers is 
to facilitate the effective functioning of the legal system.  In an
adversarial system, they do so by representing clients—lawyers are not 
judges—but significantly they must represent clients within the bounds 
of the law.  Lawyers acting in a representative capacity are agents for
their clients, and as a matter of agency law, they can have no rights 
greater than those provided by their clients’ legal entitlements.  Thus,
morality enters the role in an indirect way—through the way the role is 
established and regulated.  This is the point at which Fred’s critical 
argument enters the picture, for he wants there to be a more permeable
role, with morality woven in throughout, rather than simply being 
relevant to the design of the role and thereafter excluded. 
75. See id. at 56. 
76. See John Rawls, Reply to Habermas, 92 J. PHIL. 132 (1995), reprinted in 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 372, 393 (2005). 
77. FINNIS, supra note 63, at 232.  There is another possibility, namely chaos, but
then there would not be a stable community.
78. For reasons well-summed up by Rawls’s burdens of judgment or Waldron’s 
circumstances of politics.  See WALDRON, supra note 66, at 101–02; Rawls, supra note 






















III. ROLE OBLIGATION AND ORDINARY MORAL OBLIGATION 
Fred’s work on the relationship between role obligations and morality
makes two claims: one descriptive and one normative.  The descriptive
claim is that the American law governing lawyers in fact does create 
space for deliberation on ordinary moral considerations.79  His normative
claim is that it, and any system of rules governing the legal profession, 
ought to do so.80  I will consider each of these points in turn, both of 
which have a core of truth but are stated too strongly.  In fact, the law of 
lawyering is fairly restrictive with respect to ordinary morality.  There 
are some places in which moral considerations may be incorporated into
deliberation, but there are many other contexts in which the reasoning to 
be followed is given by the law alone.  The law in this case consists of
the substantive and procedural law creating client entitlements as well as 
the agency, contract, and tort principles establishing the parameters of
the attorney-client relationship.  Moreover, this is, as it ought to be, in 
order that the law retain authority and be capable of fulfilling its
coordinating function.
A.  Positive Claim: The Law of Lawyering Preserves a      
Lawyer’s Integrity 
Fred cites a number of provisions in the ABA’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct that he claims incorporate, by reference, principles
of ordinary morality.81  Most of the rules he mentions are nonmandatory.
For example, Model Rule 2.1 permits, but does not require, a lawyer to
discuss with the client “other considerations such as moral, economic, 
social and political factors.”82  Most lawyers probably think they are 
permitted to discuss nonlegal factors with their clients, so if the rule has 
any function at all, it is either aspirational—suggesting that lawyers 
should have these discussions more often with their clients—or
defensive—responding to an unarticulated concern about being held
liable to clients for counseling them on nonlegal matters.  Similarly, the 
rule on the allocation of decisionmaking authority between lawyers and 
79. See Zacharias, Integrity, supra note 1, at 559–64. 
80. Id. at 566–80 (“The danger in adopting these codes is that lawyers and clients 
may come to treat lawyers too distinctly, in theory or in practice . . . .  ‘A core function 
of the codes is to put lawyers on the same moral footing as everyone else’ . . . .”).  Fred
talks about the codes as “a mechanism for tweaking generally applicable legal and
ethical constraints to fit lawyers’ peculiar lives,” id. at 566, indicating his commitment to 
the nexus view of roles. 
81. See id. at 560 (setting out table of rules “suggesting the pertinence of universal
ethical behavior”). 
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clients, and a comment to that rule, simply restates a principle of agency
law that lawyers have discretion to make decisions with respect to the 
means used to accomplish client objectives.83  Fred reads this as a
permission to “exercise common courtesy”84 because this is the rule that
is implicated when one discusses cases in which the client wants the 
lawyer to be a hyperaggressive advocate,85 but again the rule does not 
impose obligations on lawyers.
On the other hand, there are many provisions in the Model Rules that
create stark conflicts with ordinary morality.  Daniel Markovits argues 
that the law of lawyering, considered as a whole, requires lawyers to lie
and cheat.86  The requirements of the lawyer’s role sharply diverge from 
morality, and any “technical limits”87 placed by the positive law 
governing lawyers are just that—marginal constraints on what is, at root,
a practice with an innate normativity, an “organic structure,”88 that 
mandates vicious conduct.  It is not necessary to characterize the 
lawyer’s role as a unified whole, however, in order to make the point 
that in some cases a lawyer will be obligated to do something that would 
otherwise be a moral wrong.  The famous Spaulding case, for example,
involves a conflict between, on the one hand, the moral obligation to 
take steps to save another’s life, at least if it is possible to do so 
relatively easily and without exposing oneself to risk, and on the other,
the legal duty of confidentiality.89  Although students often want to find
83. See id. R. 1.2(a) & cmt. 2. 
84. See Zacharias, Integrity, supra note 1, at 560. 
85. See  STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND 
ETHICS 87–88 (8th ed. 2009). 
86. See MARKOVITS, supra note 60, at 35. 
87. Id. at 42. 
88. Id. at 45. 
89. See Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).  For an 
excellent historical reexamination of the case, see Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles,
Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions: Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. 
L. REV. 63 (1998).  Briefly, for those readers who somehow have made it this far into the 
Article and do not know about Spaulding, the facts of the case are as follows,
embellished somewhat to make the case more fun to teach: Spaulding and Zimmerman 
were involved in a car accident.  Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d. at 706–07.  As part of the 
postaccident negligence lawsuit, Zimmerman’s lawyer required Spaulding to submit to 
an independent medical examination at which a doctor hired by Zimmerman examined 
Spaulding to make sure he was not exaggerating his injuries.  Id. at 707.  This doctor
diagnosed an aortic aneurysm—a dilation and weakening of a major blood vessel, which 
might rupture if not repaired surgically—of traumatic origin, which meant it resulted 
from the car accident. Id.  Spaulding’s own physician, who treated him after the accident, had













   
 
    








    
 
  
a way to wriggle out from the obligation of confidentiality, the rule in 
effect at the time did in fact prohibit the defense lawyer from disclosing 
the life-threatening injury, without the informed consent of the client,
which I stipulate was refused.90  There is no need to say that the role of 
lawyer always requires vicious conduct; interesting cases arise often
enough that lawyers may expect to be faced with a conflict between the 
requirements of ordinary morality and their professional duties. 
In those cases, the “integrity rules” pointed out by Fred do not offer 
much solace.  True, the defense lawyer in Spaulding can counsel the 
client to disclose the plaintiff’s life-threatening injury,91 but in the end, if
the defendant refuses to give informed consent to disclosure, it would be 
a serious violation of the duty of confidentiality for the defense lawyer to 
reveal the information.92  If the lawyer has a “fundamental disagreement”
with the defendant’s refusal to disclose,93 the lawyer is permitted to
withdraw from the representation—if the trial judge agrees, that is94— 
but withdrawal just passes the buck to the next lawyer and does not help 
the plaintiff.  The lawyer is stuck with an ethical dilemma, forcing a 
choice between following the duty of confidentiality and responding to
the ordinary moral requirement to disclose.  Of course cases like Spaulding
do not arise every day, but it is not difficult to think of examples like this 
one, in which there are no integrity rules permitting reference to ordinary
morality.
or a negotiated settlement on the assumption that his damages were relatively modest.
Id. at 707–09.  Spaulding’s lawyer failed to request a copy of the medical examination 
report from Zimmerman’s lawyer, as he was entitled to do under the civil discovery
rules, which were relatively new at the time in Minnesota and thus possibly unfamiliar to
the lawyers. See id.  Disclosing the aneurysm would eliminate the lurking risk of
Spaulding’s death but would drive up the Zimmerman’s damages, perhaps over the limits of
his liability insurance policy.
90. To make the problem difficult, when I teach this case, I ask students to assume
that Zimmerman is a mean-spirited person who is completely indifferent to Spaulding’s 
welfare and refuses to consent to the lawyer disclosing the information.  In reality,
however, Zimmerman was nineteen years old at the time of the accident; Spaulding was
twenty, and riding in Zimmerman’s car, so it is fair to infer that they were friends.
Cramton & Knowles, supra note 89, at 88.  I also hypothesize that Zimmerman could be 
financially ruined if he is hit for a judgment for the full amount of Spaulding’s damages,
taking the aneurysm into account.  In fact, the parties never contemplated damages in 
excess of the limits of the various insurance policies, for reasons relating to substantive 
tort law then in effect.  Id. at 69–70. 
91. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010). 
92. See id. R. 1.6(a) (2010) (duty of confidentiality and informed consent permitting 
disclosure). 
93. See id. R. 1.16(b)(4) (2010). 
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B.  Normative Claim: The Law of Lawyering Should 
Preserve a Lawyer’s Integrity 
Perhaps this observation raises precisely the problem—there are not
enough integrity rules.  A persistent theme in legal ethics scholarship is 
that ordinary morality ought to play more of a role in the deliberation of
lawyers.  David Luban and Deborah Rhode, for example, have argued 
that lawyers ought to accept personal moral responsibility for their 
actions when acting in a representative capacity.95  As Kant noted, 
“ought” implies “can,” so if lawyers must accept moral responsibility for 
their actions, they must have the authority to act in the way morality 
requires. Thus, more integrity rules are needed.  Similarly, William 
Simon argues that lawyers “should take those actions that, considering
the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote
justice.”96  Although this is a bit of a contested point, I think when
Simon talks about justice he means to refer to substantive justice, quite 
apart from the legal merits of a party’s position.97  His examples of 
lawyers participating in injustice are often cases, such as nondisclosure 
of confidential information, in which the legal merits of the client’s 
position would be substantively unjust.98  Simon claims to “reject[] the
common tendency to attribute the tensions of legal ethics to a conflict 
between the demands of legality on the one hand and those of nonlegal, 
personal or ordinary morality on the other.”99  In the end, however, if
there is a conflict, morality, in the guise of substantive justice, has the 
final say. 
95. See  LUBAN, supra note 21, at 160–74; DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS 
OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 17, 58 (2000) (arguing that lawyers
should take “personal moral responsibility for the consequences of their professional 
acts” and that lawyers should “act on the basis of their own principled convictions, even 
when they recognize that others could in good faith hold different views”); David Luban, 
Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to
Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1005 (1990) (“Morally activist lawyers hold 
themselves accountable for the means they employ and the ends they pursue on behalf of 
clients.”).
96. SIMON, supra note 33, at 138. 
97. See id. at 82 (distinguishing a substantive conception of law, in contrast with
positivism, which is committed to an interpretation of “specific legal norms as expressions of
more general principles that are indissolubly legal and moral”). 
98. See, e.g., id. at 62 (noting the divergence between the “technical” rules 
respecting confidentiality and the intuitions of lawyers and clients regarding what justice 
requires). 

















The question therefore becomes, should there be more integrity rules?
Or, in the terms of this analysis, should the lawyer’s role be structured as 
a recourse role?  Let us assume that there is a case in which the lawyer 
believes that doing what the law requires—either the lawyer doing it or 
the client doing it—would be morally wrong.  Is the lawyer justified in
departing from the role and violating the law?  In general, an actor
departing from the requirements of a role must make two judgments 
regarding both merit and appropriateness.100  Merit refers to the first-
order moral reasons that would bear on the actions of any moral agent. 
Consider circumstances similar to those in the Spaulding case,101 in 
which a person knows information that could save another’s life if 
disclosed.  That person should consider the importance of saving a life, 
as well as any interests that support confidentiality, such as a promise of 
secrecy made in order to acquire the information.  When that person is 
specified to be a lawyer, however, judgments of appropriateness become
necessary as well.  These judgments pertain to whether it is acceptable 
for a particular agent to take an action, for example: “Actions of type A
are (or are not) up to agent X.”102  Maybe an ordinary moral agent can, or 
must, disclose the secret information, but it may not be appropriate for a
lawyer to do so. 
Central to the idea of a recourse role is that departures from the role
must be justified on the grounds that there are “social needs that might 
otherwise go unanswered, where those needs are measured by the ends 
for which the role was initially instituted.”103  Recall Simon’s argument 
from incoherence, summarized previously.104  His point was that it is 
incoherent for lawyers to believe that their role and its associated 
demands are morally worthy because it contributes to justice, and then at 
the same time act in ways that subverts justice.  We need not take for 
granted, however, that the ends of the legal system and the role of 
lawyer are justice.  I have argued that the legal system, and therefore the 
lawyer’s role, are aimed at maintaining a scheme of legal entitlements 
that allows citizens to structure their dealings with each other and with
the state, with reference to norms that have been established collectively 
in the name of society as a whole.  This is a much more positivistic 
conception of the role, with entitlements—established by positive law— 
and not justice, serving as the foundation.  The argument about 
coordinating compliance with the demands of morality is necessary to 
 100. KADISH & KADISH, supra note 24, at 7. 
101. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 102. KADISH & KADISH, supra note 24, at 7 (emphasis added). 
103. Id. at 32–33. 
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give some moral worth to entitlements,105 but if it is accepted, then we 
have the outline of an approach to the lawyer’s professional role that
includes very different recourse conditions.  Law can perform its 
function as a distinctive mode of governance precisely because of its
independence from contested moral considerations.  Thus, disagreement 
with the moral content of the law cannot be a basis for opting out of the
requirements of the lawyer’s role.
One might argue that, given the diversity of reasonable moral points
of view, it is inevitable that any collective social decision will strike
some citizens as at least wrongheaded, and possibly even unjust.  If the 
basis for the authority of law is that it enables collective social action in 
the face of disagreement, the beliefs of citizens about the immorality of
alternative courses of action are irrelevant to the obligation to obey. 
Dissensus is, after all, what got us into the circumstances of politics in 
which citizens have an interest in coordinated action notwithstanding 
their moral disagreements.  Something that one citizen finds appalling 
may strike another as perfectly acceptable.  Thus, in order to justify 
departing from a role—one of the most important ends of which is 
settling moral conflict—an action must be more than ordinarily unjust.  I 
can only speculate about the beliefs of citizens on both sides of, say, the 
abortion debate, but I do not believe the perceived injustice involved in
either legalized abortion or the restrictions on the availability of abortion 
justifies disobeying an abortion-related law.  Committed pro-choice and 
pro-life activists may be dissatisfied with the current regime of abortion 
regulation, and both may regard it as morally wrong, but as a society we 
have to do something about abortion—either permit it or not, or make its 
availability subject to particular restrictions, or not—and there is no way
to settle on the appropriate social response solely with reference to
arguments concerning whether it is just.  We have been having these 
moral arguments for decades about abortion, and they appear no closer
to resolution.  It does not help to compare some present injustice with
some historical norms that we now universally acknowledge as an evil, 
like slavery.  There are plenty of American citizens who believe that
105. As David Luban has noted, lawyers attempt to pull a moral rabbit out of the hat 
of the positive duties that define the lawyer’s role.  But the trick, of course, depends on 
getting the rabbit into the hat in the first place, and without some moral reason to respect 
the law, there would be no reason to respect the requirements of a role that are keyed to
legal obligations. See David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen 





















   
  
 
abortion is an evil on a par with slavery.  There is also probably an equal 
number of citizens who believe banning abortion would be a great moral 
evil, and some might compare the situation of women who lack full
reproductive freedom with slavery. Perhaps there are other issues that 
provoke similar comparisons—school prayer, assisted suicide, the death
penalty, or same-sex marriages.  If a conception of roles permitted a 
lawyer to opt out when something approaching the substantive injustice 
of slavery were involved, then people on both sides of all of these 
debates would seek to appeal to this exception, and the result would be a
return to the quagmire of disagreement that the law was supposed to 
avoid.
This strikes many legal theorists as much too strong, and they 
accordingly have sought to link the authority of law tightly with substantive
justice.  For example, on Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin’s account,
the law has authority only insofar as it makes it more likely that citizens 
will comply with the requirements of morality:
[W]e are interested in more than coordination.  The controversies Lex [the
personified authority, “the law,”] addresses can be settled in better or worse 
ways, and one of the benefits the community seeks from his rules is avoidance 
of moral error through the application of Lex’s superior expertise.  Members of 
the community presumably have selected Lex because they have confidence in
his moral expertise.106 
Heidi Hurd similarly contends that the law has authority only to the 
extent it directs citizens to the action that is morally required: “[T]he
intentions of lawmakers are, on this view, a heuristic guide to
determining the content of the law, which is itself a heuristic guide to 
determining the content of morality.”107  Contrary to the Brandeisian 
view that “[i]t is almost as important that the law should be settled
permanently, as that it should be settled correctly,”108 Alexander, 
Sherwin, and Hurd believe that the law functions as an authority in
practical reasoning only to the extent it succeeds in guiding citizens
toward the actions required by morality.  This adds an element of natural
law theory to what would otherwise be a positivist account, that is, Lex’s
laying down a law that settles a dispute. 
The Alexander-Sherwin-Hurd position—that the law serves as a 
heuristic or a proxy for determining the content of morality—would 
underwrite at most a weak, defeasible claim of obligation within a role.
 106. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, 
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 98–99 (2001). 
107. Heidi M. Hurd, Interpreting Authorities, in  LAW AND INTERPRETATION 405,
425 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995). 
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Lawyers should therefore be open to the possibility of rebalancing the 
underlying reasons to see whether the directives of law did, in fact, track 
the requirements of morality.  This is the nexus view.  As such, it relies 
on a tacit assumption that the nature of compliance with the demands of 
morality is the same in communities as it is for individuals acting in 
relative isolation.  Any time one faces a demand for moral justification it 
means that the interests of others are involved because morality is 
fundamentally about justification to others in terms they cannot 
reasonably reject.109  But it is important not to assume that the techniques of
moral analysis that are appropriate to relatively small-scale interactions
are necessarily appropriate to acting in communities characterized by 
reasonable ethical pluralism.110  With regard to the need for ethical 
justification in large-scale communities, it is not accurate to say that law
has authority insofar as it enables individuals to comply with the 
demands of morality, as they would exist in the absence of a community. 
Rather, the law enables individuals to act on the common good, when
the “common good” is understood as “a whole ensemble of material and
other conditions that tend to favour the realization, by each individual in 
the community, of his or her personal development.”111  Individual
reason alone will not lead to a conclusion regarding what morality
requires in a community because compliance with morality in a 
community means coordinating one’s own beliefs about morality with 
the beliefs of others. 
Thus, it will be a relatively unusual case that the ends of the lawyer’s
role will be frustrated, justifying opting out of the role, not following the 
directives of the role, and having direct recourse back to the underlying
ends of the role.  In a case like Spaulding, many legal ethics theorists
would permit recourse back to ordinary morality where the result—the 
lawyer’s refusal to disclose the injury—seems unjust.  The claim here,
by contrast, is that opting out of the role is permitted only when there 
has been a failure of the law to provide a basis for cooperating in the 
face of disagreement.  The rules governing attorney confidentiality are 
109. See SCANLON, supra note 55. 
110. See FINNIS, supra note 63, at 136 (“[T]he complexity of human community . . . 
is often lost sight of by those who attempt to explain one order of reality using 
exclusively techniques of analysis suitable for another order . . . .”). 














   
    
    
  
 




   
  
   
 
  
among the most contentious aspects of the law of lawyering.112  Every  
sector of the bar and the academy, as well as the public, has weighed in 
on the debate.113  The confidentiality rule and its exceptions represent a
legitimate resolution of normative controversy and, as such, should be 
respected by lawyers and citizens.  There is no fundamental failure of 
the lawyer’s role, in terms of the purposes for which it is constituted, if 
the defendant refuses to disclose the full extent of the plaintiff’s injury, 
as the lawyer is permitted to do. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is something distinctive about the law, legal reasoning, and the 
role of lawyers.  That distinctiveness is captured by the idea that 
normative reasoning by citizens in communities is necessarily aimed at
discovering what rights and obligations everyone ought to have, 
consistent with the interests of other citizens.  It is implausible to believe 
that ordinary moral reasoning is well suited to working out a scheme of 
public entitlements that is suited to regulating the interactions among 
citizens who disagree about what their entitlements ought to be.  The law 
has authority to the extent it enables people to do better than they 
otherwise could at the project of living and working together in a 
relatively peaceful, stable political community.  In order to perform this 
function, however, the law must create exclusionary, second-order
reasons for both citizens and lawyers.  The lawyer’s professional role
may be described as a recourse role, but because the end of the law is
coordination, it will be a very unusual case in which lawyers may
disregard the obligations of the role and act directly on ordinary moral 
considerations. 
112. As it happens, one of Fred’s other major interests is attorney-client 
confidentiality. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Fact and Fiction in the Restatement of the 
Law Governing Lawyers: Should the Confidentiality Provisions Restate the Law?, 6 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 903 (1993); Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and 
Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69 (1999); Fred C. Zacharias, Privilege and Confidentiality 
in California, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 367 (1995); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking 
Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989).  These articles cite the voluminous 
literature in legal ethics on confidentiality, arguing for stricter or looser disclosure rules.
113. For an example of a recent iteration of the debate over confidentiality, which 
included significant input from regulated industries and the public, consider section 307
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006), which requires the SEC to 
promulgate rules governing attorney conduct in connection with representing an issuer of 
securities.  The possibility that the SEC might mandate disclosure of client fraud caused 
apoplexy in much of the securities bar, and the provisions that were eventually adopted
did not mandate disclosure.  See, e.g., M. Peter Moser & Stanley Keller, Sarbanes-Oxley 
307: Trusted Counselors or Informers?, 49 VILL. L. REV. 833 (2004) (citing criticism of
the SEC’s proposal).  For a balanced assessment, see Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and
Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725 (2004). 
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